Western New England Law Review
Volume 35 35 (2013)
Issue 1

Article 9

1-1-2013

DISABILITY AND THE LAW—PERSON V.
PAPER: WHY CONNECTICUT’S IQ
CUTOFF SCORE IS A BARRICADE TO SELFBETTERMENT
Kathleen D. Tetreault

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Kathleen D. Tetreault, DISABILITY AND THE LAW—PERSON V. PAPER: WHY CONNECTICUT’S IQ CUTOFF SCORE IS A
BARRICADE TO SELF-BETTERMENT, 35 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 279 (2013), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol35/
iss1/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

TETREAULT FINAL 51313.DOC

5/15/13 2:45 PM

DISABILITY AND THE LAW—PERSON V. PAPER: WHY
CONNECTICUT’S IQ CUTOFF SCORE IS A BARRICADE TO SELFBETTERMENT
ABSTRACT
State-based supports and services are essential to improving the
quality of life of many individuals with intellectual disabilities.
However, access to vital assistance is often reserved for those who
satisfy the state’s definition of “intellectual disability.” On a national
scale, Connecticut employs the most restrictive definition of intellectual
disability, denying services to individuals with intensive needs simply
because they have an IQ score above 69. Effectively, Connecticut
quantifies the quality of life of individuals with intellectual disabilities.
This Note argues that Connecticut’s eligibility criteria is
inconsistent with the best practices set forth by the American
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). In
assessing intellectual disability, the AAIDD dispels of strict IQ cutoff
scores and instead engages in a holistic inquiry emphasizing the
individual’s overall well-being. This Note calls upon the Connecticut
legislature to enact a statutory amendment that will modernize
Connecticut’s eligibility practices, and ensure that Connecticut is
meeting its imperative of providing assistance to those most in need.
INTRODUCTION
Michael’s mother considered her son one of the “lucky” ones.1 She
looked on as Michael flourished in his accomplishments, quietly
celebrating the richness of her son’s life. Michael’s commitments were
both dynamic and diverse; with the help of a job coach, Michael worked
part-time at the local library,2 and through the guidance of a mentor, he

1. An Act Concerning Expansion of the Pilot Program for Persons with Autism
Spectrum Disorders: Hearing on Substitute for H.B. 5666 (2008) (statement of Cathy A.)
[hereinafter Statement of Cathy A.], available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/PHdata/
Tmy/2008HB-05666-R000312-Cathy%20Adamczyk-TMY.PDF.
2. An Act Concerning Expansion of the Pilot Program for Persons with Autism
Spectrum Disorders: Hearing on Substitute for H.B. 5666 (2008) (statement of Michael A.),
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/PHdata/Tmy/2008HB-05666-R000312-Michael
%20Adamczyk-TMY.PDF.
279
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developed an enviable social life.3 He frequently swam at the YMCA
preparing for the Special Olympics, ultimately winning two gold medals
in the 2011 Summer Games.4 He also shone as a leader amongst his
peers, serving as a youth advocate for individuals with disabilities.5 His
outstanding community service was recognized by the Commissioner of
the Department of Developmental Services (DDS), who awarded
Michael the first ever DDS scholarship at the Governor’s Coalition for
Youth with Disabilities Scholarships.6
Although Michael has an intellectual disability,7 which is
characterized by deficits in intellectual functioning and difficulty
meeting social expectations,8 he has overcome many challenges and
achieved countless successes through the help of DDS. This same level
of achievement would not have been possible without DDS’s
intercession.9
And so Michael was lucky, because having garnered IQ scores of
64 and 69 during his youth,10 he satisfied DDS’s IQ cutoff score of 69
and remained eligible to receive supports and services.11 Unlike other
3. Id.
4. See 2011 News and Events: Adamczyk Shines in the Pool, UCONN HEALTH CENTER
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.uconnucedd.org/news_events/2011/adamczyk.html.
5. See The Connecticut Youth Leadership Project Welcomes Kids as Self-Advocates,
YOUTH LEADERSHIP TODAY (Connecticut Youth Leadership Project) Mar. 2007, at 5,
available at http://www.ctylp.org/files/YLP_Newsletter_03.07.pdf.
6. Letter from Terrence W. Macy, Comm’r of Dep’t of Developmental Servs. (June 2,
2011), available at http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?A=4171&Q=508574.
7. See Statement of Cathy A., supra note 1 (using the term “mental retardation” rather
than “intellectual disability”). Michael also has “classical autism,” a developmental disorder
that causes “abnormal or impaired development in social interaction and communication and a
markedly restricted repertoire of activity and interests.” Id. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION: DSMIV-TR, 70 (4th ed. 2000). All mental disorders aside from intellectual disability are beyond
the scope of this Note.
8. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS, 5 (11th ed. 2010).
The definition also requires the disability to occur before age 18. The age of onset
requirement is beyond the scope of this Note. Id. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011)
(defining intellectual disability as “a significant limitation in intellectual functioning and
deficits in adaptive behavior that originated during the developmental period before eighteen
years of age”).
9. Michael’s mother attributed his success to DDS’s assistance, recognizing that her
own ability to support Michael was limited by her parental duties to her other three children as
well as personal health issues. See Statement of Cathy A., supra note 1.
10. At age nine Michael’s IQ was 64, and at ages twelve and fifteen it was 69.
Transcript of Hearing at 21, Dep’t of Developmental Servs. v. Michael A. (June 17, 2011)
(unpublished transcript from administrative hearing) (on file with author).
11. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011); Individual and Family Fact Sheet: Eligibility
for Services from the Department of Developmental Services [hereinafter Fact Sheet], DEP’T
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individuals with intellectual disabilities who wither in the face of similar
obstacles, Michael’s IQ score qualified him for vital assistance that
helped him thrive.12
Yet despite his success, Michael’s mother worried that one day her
son, whose IQ skimmed along the cutoff score for DDS services, might
test slightly above it.13 Fearing his proximity to that “‘magical 70’
number”—the number with disqualifying force—she asked, “[i]f his IQ
goes up one point to 70, does that mean that he no longer needs
assistance in life?”14 Her fears were realized one year later when
Michael received an IQ score of 83.15 Soon thereafter, DDS found him
ineligible for services.16
The turn in Michael’s story is not unique within Connecticut.17
Connecticut’s eligibility statute, section 1-1g, is satisfied by an IQ of 69
or below and demonstrated difficulty with activities of daily living.18
Yet despite these dual requirements, a higher IQ score is dispositive,
disqualifying individuals regardless of their ability to cope with daily
life.19 Effectively, individuals with intensive needs are denied services
and supports based upon quantitative data rather than qualitative needs.20
This Note argues that DDS’s use of a rigid IQ cutoff score to
determine eligibility for supports and services creates an overly narrow

DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS. http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=2050&q=382310 (last
updated Nov. 19, 2007).
12. See infra Part IV.B (portraying the difficulties encountered by individuals with
intellectual disabilities who are denied necessary supports and services).
13. See Statement of Cathy A., supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Dep’t of Developmental Servs. v. Michael A. (Conn. Dep’t of Developmental Servs.
July 11, 2011) (Proposed Decision) (on file with author).
16. Id. Michael appealed DDS’s finding of ineligibility, and upon review an
administrative hearing officer found that Michael was eligible for continued services. Id.
Although the DDS Commissioner affirmed this decision, he found that Michael did not satisfy
section 1-1g. Rather, he found that because Michael was a lifelong client of DDS, it would be
inequitable to revoke his services. Thus, if the Commissioner strictly considered whether
Michael was eligible for services under DDS’s eligibility statute, Michael would have been
found ineligible.
17. There are several cases wherein DDS applicants demonstrate adaptive needs, but
are denied services due to an IQ score above 69. See, e.g., Christopher R. v. Comm’r of
Mental Retardation, 893 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2006); Costello v. Comm’r of Developmental
Servs., 16 A.3d 811 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011); Allan G. v. O’Meara, No. CV105014972S, 2011
WL 3211281 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 29, 2011); Malcolm v. O’Meara, No. CV040527349S,
2005 WL 1083794 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2005); Martinez v. O’Meara, No. CV
00499604, 2001 WL 527505 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2001).
18. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011); Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
19. See infra Parts III, IV.
20. See infra Part IV.
OF
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definition of intellectual disability that is inconsistent with best
practices.21 Consequently, individuals with intellectual disabilities are
denied assistance integral to their quality of life.22
The best practices for the assessment of intellectual disability are
set forth in the 2010 manual published by the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD).23 This manual
rejects the use of IQ cutoff scores, instead utilizing a broader assessment
method that considers the individual’s overall well-being.24 Thus, to
ensure that Connecticut residents with intellectual disabilities are
assessed fairly and accurately, the legislature must require DDS to
abandon IQ cutoff scores and promulgate regulations consistent with the
2010 AAIDD manual.25
Part I of this Note discusses DDS’s statutory responsibility to
provide services and supports to Connecticut residents with intellectual
disabilities. In light of DDS’s important role, Part II examines whether
Connecticut’s eligibility criteria comports with best practices by
presenting a historical overview of the social meaning of intellectual
disability and the assessment methods used leading up to the 2010
AAIDD manual. Subsequently, Part III discusses the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s interpretation of DDS’s eligibility criteria through the
seminal case of Christopher R. v. Commissioner of Mental
Retardation.26 Finally, Part IV argues that DDS misses the watermark
for best practices in eligibility determinations and urges the legislature to
amend DDS’s enabling act to require compliance with the 2010 AAIDD
definition.
DDS’s eligibility determinations are confined to the paper—the
four corners of an IQ test. These practices fail to consider the person—
the individual’s overall level of need.
By modernizing DDS’s
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Parts III, IV.
23. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8. The definition of intellectual disability set forth by the AAIDD and the American
Psychiatric Association (APA) “are currently considered the ‘gold standard’ with regard to
definition and classification.” Barbara Tylenda et al., Assessing Mental Retardation Using
Standardized Intelligence Tests, in 34 HANDBOOK OF ASSESSMENT IN PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 29 (Johnny L. Matson, ed. 2007). This Note focuses primarily
upon the AAIDD definition because Connecticut’s eligibility statute was based upon the
definition of intellectual disability set forth by the AAIDD in its 1977 manual. See An Act
Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation: Hearing Before the H.R., Vol. 25, Part 2 at
407, 410 (Conn. 1982).
24. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8, at 14, 35; infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. 893 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2006).
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regulations, eligibility determinations would be based upon a holistic
understanding of the individual rather than IQ alone, effectively putting
the person before the paper.27 Under the proposed amendment,
Connecticut would meet the needs of all residents who have intellectual
disabilities, and not just those who happen to be so “lucky.”28
I.

THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONNECTICUT DDS

DDS plays a vital role in improving the quality of life of
individuals with intellectual disabilities.29 As Connecticut’s most
comprehensive resource for individuals with intellectual disabilities,
DDS arguably has both a statutory and ethical responsibility to serve this
population.30
A. The Origins of DDS and the Supports and Services it Provides
DDS is a beacon for individuals with intellectual disabilities,
providing assistance that spans from birth until death.31 DDS was
created in 1975, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes section 17a210, which states that DDS is “responsible for the planning,
development and administration of complete, comprehensive and
integrated state-wide services for persons with intellectual disability . . .
.” 32 In 1990, the legislature required DDS to promulgate regulations for
determining who is eligible for these services.33 Consequently, DDS
27. See infra Part IV.
28. Statement of Cathy A., supra note 1.
29. See
Mission
Statement,
DEP’T
OF
DEVELOPMENTAL
SERVS.,
http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=3&q=330182 (setting forth DDS’s mission to improve
the well-being of individuals with intellectual disabilities) (last updated Oct. 4, 2012).
30. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-210 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-212 (2011)
(providing DDS’s statutory obligations).
31. DDS offers a “Birth to Three” program for individuals who exhibit developmental
delays early on. See Connecticut Birth to Three System, A Family Handbook: Guide 1:
Referral and Eligibility Evaluation, DEP’T OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS. 3 (2010),
http://www.birth23.org/families/FamilyHandbookI.pdf. However, individuals must satisfy
section 1-1g of the Connecticut General Statutes to receive services when they have aged out
of this program. Id. On the other end of the spectrum, DDS offers aging services to help
facilitate the aging process. About Aging Services, DEP’T OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS.,
http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=3424&q=412318 (last updated Dec. 31, 2012).
32. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-210 (2011). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-212 (2011)
(requiring DDS to “establish[] (1) criteria for (A) determining eligibility for services provided
by the department . . .”).
33. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-212 (2011) (providing that “[o]n or before September
30, 1991, the Commissioner of Developmental Services shall adopt regulations . . .
establishing (1) criteria for (A) determining eligibility for services provided by the
department”). See also CONN. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW AND
INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE, MANAGEMENT AUDIT (Jan. 1990) (requiring DDS to establish
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incorporated Connecticut General Statutes section 1-1g into its
regulations, providing that anyone who has an intellectual disability, as
defined by section 1-1g, is eligible for services.34
DDS offers an array of services and supports35 tailored to individual
needs and implemented to improve quality of life.36 For instance, DDS
provides services that fulfill housing,37 healthcare,38 and employment
needs.39
Additionally, DDS offers educational, behavioral, and
emotional supports to facilitate the development of social and
communication skills.40
DDS’s services also benefit the family
members of individuals with intellectual disabilities; in-home supports
for families who act as caregivers41 bestow an intangible benefit: “peace
of mind” that their loved one will be taken care of when they are no
longer capable of providing this care themselves.42

clear eligibility criteria).
34. See CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-212-2(b)(2) (2001) & § 17a-212-1(10) (2001)
(providing, respectively, that “[a] person is eligible for services of the department if he . . . has
mental retardation” “as defined in section 1-1g . . . ”).
35. See generally Supports & Services Topics A-Z, DEP’T OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS.,
http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=3&q=457532 (listing the supports and services that
DDS offers) (last updated Dec. 12, 2012).
36. When an individual is deemed eligible, DDS determines the individual’s “level of
need” to identify the most beneficial services and supports. See Assessing Level of Need for
Supports, DEP’T OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS., http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a
=2042&q=394074 (last visited May 13, 2013).
37. DDS provides a selection of living arrangements that vary depending upon the
individual’s level of functioning. For instance, DDS offers supported living options for
individuals in need of constant care and attention, as well as community living options for
those who wish to live independently. See Community Living Services, DEP’T OF
DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS., http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=2042&q=390162 (last
updated Feb. 25, 2008).
38. See Health and Clinical Services, DEP’T OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS.,
http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=2042&q=386604 (last updated Dec. 14, 2011).
39. DDS offers employment assistance by providing transportation and job coaches to
promote success in the workplace. See Employment and Day Services, DEP’T OF
DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS., http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=2042&q=390170 (last
updated Apr. 26, 2011); Transportation, DEP’T OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS.,
http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=2653&q=429550 (last updated Jan. 6, 2011).
40. See Individual and Family Resource Teams, DEP’T OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERVS.,
http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=2042&q=391120 (last updated July 15, 2009).
41. Id.
42. See e.g., Thoughts on the Safety Net, HARCTODAY LITE (Sept. 2011) (quoting a
parent of an individual receiving supports and services who said “[o]ur entire family, our
family life, happiness and peace of mind have all been enriched. The benefits are
incalculable. I hate to think what our lives would be like without these services which we
depend on.”).
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B. Connecticut General Statutes Section 1-1g: The “Single Point of
Entry”43 for DDS Eligibility Determinations
DDS’s comprehensive services are only available to individuals
who satisfy the requirements of section 1-1g.44 Section 1-1g defines
intellectual disability as a “significant limitation in intellectual
functioning and deficit in adaptive behavior that originated during the
developmental period before eighteen years of age.”45 “[S]ignificant
limitation in intellectual functioning” is measured by an IQ score of 69
or below.46 “[A]daptive behavior” refers to “the effectiveness or degree
with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence
and social responsibility expected for the individual’s age and cultural
group . . . .”47 This definition utilizes the “dual-criterion” approach,
which considers the dual factors of general intelligence and adaptive
behavior in assessing intellectual disability.48
In June 2012, the Connecticut legislature amended section 1-1g in
an effort to comport with the most modern understanding of intellectual
disability.49 However, this amendment left the IQ cutoff score of 69

43. Five-Year Plan 2007-2012, STATE OF CONN. DEP’T OF MENTAL RETARDATION, 14
(2007), http://www.ct.gov/dds/lib/dds/commissioner/final_plan_2007.pdf (internal formatting
omitted).
44. See CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-212-2(b)(2) (2001) & § 17a-212-1(10) (2001)
(providing, respectively, that “[a] person is eligible for services of the department if he . . . has
mental retardation” “as defined in section 1-1g . . . ”).
45. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011).
46. “‘[S]ignificant limitation in intellectual functioning’ means an intelligence quotient
more than two standard deviations below the mean as measured by tests of general intellectual
functioning that are individualized, standardized and clinically and culturally appropriate to
the individual.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011). Whereas the average IQ score is 100, two
standard deviations below the average is an IQ score of 69. See Ulrich Neisser et al.,
Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 77, 78 (1996); Fact Sheet,
supra note 11.
47. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011).
48. The dual-criterion approach is the predominant method for assessing intellectual
disability, utilized by the AAIDD, World Health Organization (WHO), and the American
Psychiatric Association (APA). This assessment method is discussed in greater detail infra
Part II. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note
8, at 8-9; WORLD HEALTH ORG., Definition: Intellectual Disability (last updated 2013),
http://www.euro.who.int/en/what-we-do/health-topics/noncommunicable-diseases/mentalhealth/news/news/2010/15/childrens-right-to-family-life/definition-intellectual-disability
(stating that the disability “begins before adulthood”). See also Barbara Tylenda et al., supra
note 23, at 29.
49. H.R. & Sen. 5437, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. June 2012) (effective
Oct. 1, 2012). The amendment to section 1-1g aims to serve three principal goals. First, it
modernizes the statutory language to promote respect for individuals with intellectual
disabilities by replacing “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” with
“significant limitation in intellectual functioning.” Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011)
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unscathed.50 The legislative history from an earlier version of section 11g, along with the 2012 amendment, demonstrate that budgetary
concerns influenced the legislature’s failure to modernize the statute’s
IQ requirement.
When section 1-1g was originally passed, the legislature defended
the bright-line cutoff score of 69 on fiscal grounds, stating,
[T]he numbers of [intellectually disabled] clients in the state has
[sic] risen dramatically. There is no possibility of providing the
treatment that is necessary for all of them to the extent that special
groups would like provided. There are infinite needs with limited
resources, and I think that the reason that the bill is before us [is]

(effective through Sept. 30, 2011), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (effective Oct. 2012). See
An Act Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation and Intellectual Disability: Hearing
on H.B. 5437 Before the Pub. Health Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. June
2012) (statement of James D. McGaughey, Executive Director of the Conn. Office of
Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities) [hereinafter Statement of James
McGaughey], available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/PHdata/Tmy/2012HB-05437-R000316
James%20D.%20McGaughey,%20Executive%20Director,%20Office%20of%20Protection%2
0and%20Advocacy%20for%20Persons%20with%20Disabilities-TMY.PDF.
Second, the
amendment places equal emphasis on intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior. Prior to
the amendment, the phrasing of the statute made the intelligence requirement appear more
important, as it was listed first and was isolated from the adaptive behavior criterion.
Effectively, it seemed as if adaptive behavior was a secondary criterion, relevant only if the
intelligence criterion was satisfied. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011) (effective
through Sept. 30, 2011), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (effective Oct. 2012) (stating that
“intellectual functioning exist[s] concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior”). The
current version aims to place equal emphasis on intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior
by joining the criteria with a conjunction so that they appear to bear equal weight. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011) (intellectual disability means “a significant limitation in intellectual
functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior . . .”) (emphasis added).
See also An Act
Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation and Intellectual Disability: Hearing on H.B.
5437 Before the Pub. Health Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. June 2012)
(statement of Sandra Trionfini, attorney with Conn. Legal Servs.) [hereinafter Statement of
Sandra Trionfini], available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/PHdata/Tmy/2012HB-05437R000316-Sandra%20Trionfini,%20Attorney,%20CT%20Legal%20Services-TMY.PDF. This
change aims to serve the proponents’ third goal—to “enable clinicians to use current tools of
diagnosis, testing and clinical evaluation . . . .” See Statement of Sandra Trionfini, supra; An
Act Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation and Intellectual Disability: Hearing on
H.B. 5437 Before the Pub. Health Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. Oct. 2012)
(statement of Leslie Simoes, Director of Advocacy at the ARC Conn.) [hereinafter Statement
of Leslie Simoes], available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/PHdata/Tmy/2012HB-05437R000316Leslie%20Simoes,%20Director%20of%20Avocacy,%20The%20ARC%20Connectic
ut-TMY.PDF. By clarifying the definitional criteria, the bill’s proponents hope that clinicians
will be able to more accurately assess the service needs of individuals deemed eligible. See
Statement of Sandra Trionfini, supra; statement of Leslie Simoes, supra.
50. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011) (providing that intellectual disability is
characterized by an IQ score two standard deviations below the norm).
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Accordingly, 69 functions as a bright-line cutoff score intended to
foreclose individuals with borderline intelligence52 from accessing
supports and services reserved for “those most in need.”53 Undoubtedly,
raising the IQ cutoff score, or eliminating it altogether, would increase
eligibility for services, which in turn would increase costs to the state.
Thus, by precluding individuals with IQs above 69 from DDS eligibility,
Connecticut limited its financial responsibility for individuals with
intellectual disabilities.
Similarly, in its February 2012 session, the legislature demonstrated
an unwillingness to amend section 1-1g in a manner that might increase
the state’s fiscal obligations.54 The fiscal analysis accompanying the
proposed bill stated, “[t]here is no fiscal impact to the state or
municipalities from updating the definition of ‘mental retardation’ in the
bill. The revised definition does not change eligibility for services . . .
.”55 Several of the bill’s proponents further emphasized that the bill did
not bear financial burdens.56 Moreover, just moments before voting on
51. An Act Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation: Hearing Before the H.R.,
Vol. 25, Part 2, at 414 (Conn. 1982).
52. “Borderline intelligence” refers to individuals with IQ scores above 69, but below
the average level of intellectual functioning. Thus, individuals with “borderline intelligence”
have IQ scores bordering on average intelligence. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC.,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS FOURTH EDITION DSMIV-TR, 48 (4th ed. 2000). However, this categorization is being phased out as increased
emphasis is placed upon the individual’s abilities as determined by contextual factors, and not
IQ alone. See Borderline Intellectual Functioning, MENTALHELP.NET (May 18, 2011),
http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=doc&id=10351&cn=208.
53. An Act Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation: Hearing Before the H.R.,
Vol. 25, Part 2, at 414 (Conn. 1982).
54. See An Act Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation and Intellectual
Disability: Hearing on H.B. 5437 Before the Pub. Health Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Conn. Oct. 2012) (containing statements from two Representatives assuring the House
that the bill would not have a fiscal impact).
55. H.B. 5437, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. June 2012) (Fiscal Note),
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/FN/2012HB-05437-R000298-FN.htm.
56. See Statement of James McGaughy, supra note 49 (“DDS has been clear that it does
not believe the language of this Bill changes its criteria for eligibility.”); Statement of Sandra
Trionfini, supra note 49 (“THIS PROPOSAL DOES NOT CREATE AN ENTITLEMENT TO SERVICES.
ACCESS TO SERVICES WILL REMAIN SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY AND FUNDING. THE INTENT
OF THE NEW DEFINITION IS NOT TO BRING MORE PEOPLE INTO THE SYSTEM FOR SERVICES BUT
TO DIRECT MORE TARGETED SERVICES TO THOSE WHO ARE ELIGIBLE.”) (emphasis in

original); An Act Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation and Intellectual Disability:
Hearing on H.B. 5437 Before the Pub. Health Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn.
Oct. 2012) (statement of Terrence Macy, Comm’r of DDS), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/PHdata/Tmy/2012HB-05437-R000316Terrance%20Macy,%20
PhD;%20Commissioner,%20Department%20of%20Developmental%20Services%20(DDS)TMY.PDF (“While DDS was amenable to updating the language in the section 1-1g
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the bill’s passage, one Representative stated, “I’d also like to point out
that this legislation does not in any way bring any more people into the
system for services . . . .”57
Regardless of whether Connecticut’s failure to abandon a rigid IQ
cutoff score was fiscally motivated, Connecticut’s antiquated practices
profoundly impact the quality of life of individuals with intellectual
disabilities. Because section 1-1g has not evolved along with the social
construct and assessment methods of intellectual disability, Connecticut
continues to deprive countless individuals of imperative aid.
II. THE EVOLVING CONSTRUCT OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND ITS
ASSESSMENT METHODS
The social construct of intellectual disability has travelled a long
course.58 Along the beaten path lay stigmatizing characterizations and
abandoned identifiers, such as idiot, imbecile, moron, feebleminded, and
most recently, mentally retarded.59 These identifiers abide within a dark
corner of history, which first defined intellectual disability as social
“degeneracy.”60 This definition led to widespread institutionalization
definition, we needed to work through potential concerns that if the language was not
carefully thought out, there could be implications on expanding eligibility for DDS supports
and services and thus creating an unfunded liability for the state. This was clearly not the
intent of DDS or the advocates.”).
57. See An Act Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation and Intellectual
Disability: Hearing on H.B. 5437 Before the Pub. Health Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Conn. Oct. 2012) (statement of Representative Lyddy). Additionally, due to budgetary
limitations, even those individuals who satisfy DDS’s eligibility criteria may not receive
services. DDS services are not an entitlement, meaning that eligible individuals will not
receive services and supports if there are inadequate resources. See Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
As of June 2011, there were 549 eligible individuals on the waiting list to receive residential
services, demonstrating DDS’s limited resources as compared to the needs of eligible
individuals. Five-Year Plan 2007-2012, supra note 43, at 6. Additionally, DDS planned to
reduce its 2012 budget by $47 million. Letter from Comm’r Terrence W. Macy to State of
Conn. Dep’t of Developmental Servs. Staff (July 15, 2011), available at
http://www.ct.gov/dds/lib/dds/budget/letter_from_commissioner_macy_july_15_2011.pdf.
58. See MARK RAPLEY, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY,
30-42 (2004) (discussing the historical progression of intellectual disability as a social
construct).
59. Id.; see also Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation:
Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES
116,
117
(2007),
available
at
https://arcmass.org/Portals/0/renamingMRIDDApril2007.pdf. In January 2010, Congress
passed “Rosa’s Law,” replacing the term “mental retardation” with “intellectual disability”
throughout the statutes at large. Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010).
Connecticut enacted a similar statute in 2011. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-210d (2011).
60. See Stephen R. Schroeder & R. Matthew Reese, Historical Overview of Assessment
in Intellectual Disability, in 34 HANDBOOK OF ASSESSMENT IN PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN MENTAL
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first aimed at rehabilitation,61 and later, eradication through eugenic
tactics.62
Yet as the social perception of intellectual disability changed, so
morphed classification and assessment methods.63 The creation of
general intelligence tests “redefined feeblemindedness in new
psychological terms.”64 Currently, general intelligence is measured on a
standardized scale normed on the general population.65 On this point
scale, average intelligence is indicated by an IQ score of approximately
100.66 This score, known as a full-scale IQ, is comprised of several subtest scores that measure various aspects of intelligence.67
Eventually, the utility of intelligence tests was viewed as rather
limited, revealing an individual’s academic aptitude and little else.68
Thus, in 1959, the AAIDD added an additional criterion that focuses on
RETARDATION 1, 4 (Johnny L. Matson ed., 2007).
61. With hopes of rehabilitating “feeble-minded” individuals, institutional doctors
utilized the clinical approach—a medical model that identified the symptoms of intellectual
disability and explored possible cures. See LEILA ZENDERLAND, MEASURING MINDS: HENRY
HERBERT GODDARD AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE TESTING 74 (Mitchell
G. Ash & William R. Woodward eds., 1998). Ultimately, the doctors concluded that “feebleminded” individuals could not be successfully “normalized.” Catherine K. Harbour & Pallab
K. Maulik, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REHABILITATION, History of Intellectual
Disability 2, http://cirrie.buffalo.edu/encyclopedia/en/pdf/history_of_intellectual_disability
.pdf (last visited May 13, 2013).
62. Harbour & Maulik, supra note 61, at 2. The United States Supreme Court gave its
imprimatur to sterilizations in the 1927 case, Buck v. Bell. 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). In his
opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes infamously stated, “[i]t is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind . . . .
Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” Id. at 207.
63. See Harbour & Maulik, supra note 61, at 1 (stating that “the whole concept of
[intellectual disability] and how to define or categorize people with [intellectual disability] . . .
has been affected by how people in different cultures and in different periods of time have
defined it and understood it”). See also Stephen R. Schroeder & R. Matthew Reese, supra
note 60, at 1 (providing that “[t]he history of the assessment of people with intellectual
disabilities . . . goes back to the roots of modern day research and practice as well as to the
roots of many social policies”).
64. ZENDERLAND, supra note 61, at 102.
65. See Kirk A. Becker, History of Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales: Content &
Psychometrics, STANFORD-BINET INTELLIGENCE SCALES, FIFTH EDITION ASSESSMENT
SERVICE BULLETIN NUMBER 1, 2-4 (2003), http://www.assess.nelson.com/pdf/sb5-asb1.pdf;
Neisser et al., supra note 46, at 78.
66. See Neisser et al., supra note 46, at 77, 78.
67. Id. Today, the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler Intelligence Scales are the most
popular general intelligence tests. See Wayne Silverman et al., Stanford-Binet and WAIS IQ
Differences and Their Implications for Adults with Intellectual Disability (aka Mental
Retardation), 38 INTELLIGENCE 242, 242 (2010).
68. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8, at 43-44.
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the individual’s adaptive behavior.69 The 2010 AAIDD manual defines
adaptive behavior as “the collection of conceptual, social, and practical
skills that have been learned and are performed by people in their
everyday lives.”70 For example, an individual with adaptive deficits may
have difficulty with customary activities “such as handling money,
cooking, dressing, grooming, and [carrying out] social activities and
relationships.”71
Like general intelligence, adaptive behavior is
measured utilizing standardized tests.72
General intelligence and adaptive behavior remain at the heart of
the definition of intellectual disability, comprising the “dual-criterion”
approach.73
The 2010 AAIDD manual defines intellectual disability as
“significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive
behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive
skills.”74 This definition arose after centuries of defining and re-defining
intellectual disability.75 Although the dual-criterion approach has been
utilized since 1959, the AAIDD has continuously modified the cutoff
scores for both general intelligence and adaptive behavior.76
Particularly, changes to IQ cutoff scores strongly impact who is
diagnosed as having an intellectual disability, and who is not.77

69. See id. at 44. Adaptive behavior refers to one’s ability to perform various activities
of daily living. See id. at 43.
70. Id. “Conceptual skills” include “language; reading and writing; and money, time,
and number concepts”; “Social skills” include “interpersonal skills, social responsibility, selfesteem, gullibility, naivete (i.e. wariness), follows rules/obeys laws, avoids being victimized,
and social problem solving”; “Practical skills” include “activities of daily living (personal
care), occupational skills, use of money, safety, health care, travel/transportation,
schedules/routines, and use of the telephone.” Id. at 44.
71. See Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
72. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g(c) (2011); THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON
TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8, at 47.
73. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g(c) (2011); THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON
TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8, at 6. The dual-criterion approach is the
prevailing standard for defining intellectual disability. See Barbara Tylenda et al., supra note
23, at 29 (identifying the APA and AAIDD (formerly AAMR) as setting forth the “gold
standard” definitions of intellectual disability which are “internationally recognized and
widely adopted”).
74. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8,
at 5.
75. See id. at 5-6.
76. See AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?
IDEAS FOR AN EVOLVING DISABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3-27 [hereinafter WHAT IS
MENTAL RETARDATION?] (Harvey N. Switzky & Stephen Greenspan eds. 2006).
77. Id.
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A. The Role of IQ in Assessing Intellectual Disability
IQ cutoff scores carry serious implications, making “someone
eligible or ineligible for services.”78 From 1961 to 2010, the AAIDD
has continuously modified the cutoff scores for the general intelligence
component of intellectual disability.79 The 1961 AAIDD manual
established an IQ cutoff “score of 84 or less.”80 However, clinicians
believed that this cutoff score was overinclusive, mislabeling individuals
with “borderline intelligence” as having intellectual disabilities.81 As a
result, the revised 1973 and 1977 manuals implemented a more stringent
cutoff score of 70 or below.82 Section 1-1g continues to utilize the IQ
cutoff score of 69 or below, a lower ceiling than that set forth in the
1977 AAIDD manual.83
Every edition following the 1977 AAIDD manual created a more
lenient standard for IQ cutoff scores.84 Notably, the 1992 manual
constituted a major paradigm shift that was meant “to reduce heavy
reliance on IQ scores” and to increase the emphasis placed on “support
needs.”85 The AAIDD raised the IQ cutoff score to “approximately 70
to 75 or below” to promote a more comprehensive assessment process.86
In 1992, intellectual disability was newly understood as the
relationship “between the person’s capacities and the context in which
the person is to function.”87 More illustratively put,
78. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8,
at 5.
79. WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note 76, at 3-28; THE AAIDD AD HOC
COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8, at xiii-xiv.
80. WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note 76, at 5-6.
81. Id. at 8-9. “Borderline intellectual functioning describes an IQ range that is higher
than that for Mental Retardation.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION: DSM-IV-TR, 48 (4th ed. 2000)
(citations omitted). However, the AAIDD and forthcoming Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
no longer utilize this categorization.
See Borderline Intellectual Functioning,
MENTALHELP.NET
(May
18,
2011),
http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_
doc.php?type=doc&id=10351&cn=208. The Connecticut legislature echoed concerns of
overinclusivity when it passed section 1-1g, stating that the “definition[] would be helpful in
clarifying the distinction between [intellectual disability] and what is called borderline
intelligence.” An Act Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation: Hearing Before the
H.R., Vol. 25, Part 2, at 408 (Conn. 1982).
82. Due to differences in testing “metrics,” the cutoff score on the Stanford-Binet test
was 68. See WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note 76, at 9-11.
83. See id.; Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
84. See WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note 76, at 11-27.
85. Id. at 18.
86. Id. at 17; AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION:
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 35-36 (9th ed. 1992).
87. WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note 76, at 13. Prior to 1992, being
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[intellectual disability] . . . is not something you have, like blue eyes
or a bad heart. Nor is it something you are, like being short or thin.
It is not a medical disorder, although it may be coded in a medical
classification of diseases . . . . Nor is it a mental disorder, although it
may be coded in a classification of psychiatric disorders.
[Intellectual disability] refers to a particular state of functioning that
begins in childhood and in which limitations in intelligence coexist
88
with related limitations in adaptive skills.

Based upon this new understanding, the classification process is a
means toward identifying the supports and services that will increase the
individual’s overall well-being.89 The 2010 definition built upon these
definitional changes.90
B. Intellectual Disability and the 2010 AAIDD Manual
The 2010 AAIDD manual frames intellectual disability within the
context of the human experience.91 Intellectual disability is but one
aspect of the individual that is influenced by the elements of life.92 The
AAIDD conceptualizes these elements within a multi-dimensional
framework of human functioning, including: (1) intellectual abilities, (2)
adaptive behavior, (3) health, (4) participation, and (5) context.93
Within this framework, intellectual abilities and adaptive behavior
remain central to the diagnostic process.94 However, clinicians must
also consider the individual’s health, recognizing that there is a direct
correlation between “physical, mental, and social well-being” and level
classified as intellectually disabled was similar to being diagnosed with a non-treatable
condition.
AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY &
CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 19 (rev. ed. 1977). Individuals were categorized
into different levels of functioning based upon their IQ. Id. Those with IQ scores of 69-55
were considered “mildly retarded;” 54-50 as “moderately retarded;” 39-25 as “severely
retarded;” and 25 or below as “profoundly retarded.” Id. (based on the Wechsler standard
deviation). According to this system, each category was indicative of the individual’s
functional capabilities. Id. at 17-19. Thus, intellectual disability was construed as an
immutable characteristic, and the diagnostic process was treated as an end in itself. THE
AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8, at xiii-xiv.
88. AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION,
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 9 (9th ed. 1992).
89. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8,
at 13-19.
90. Id. at xiv.
91. See id. at 14.
92. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8,
at 13.
93. See id. at 14.
94. The AAIDD employs the dual-criterion approach. See id. at 1.
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of functioning.95 Contextual factors such as gender, age, race, and
upbringing, as well as environmental factors, like living and work
conditions, also help develop a fully-textured understanding of the
individual.96 Ultimately, the multidimensional approach to intellectual
disability infuses the diagnostic process with a clear objective—to
improve the individual’s quality of life with appropriate supports and
services.97
Furthermore, the 2010 AAIDD manual rejects bright-line IQ cutoff
scores.98 The dual-criterion approach places equal emphasis on general
intelligence and adaptive behavior.99 However, the AAIDD expressed
concern that rigid IQ cutoff scores overshadow adaptive behavior,
effectively reducing the diagnostic process to a single-criterion
approach.100 Consequently, rigid cutoff scores render an individual
automatically ineligible for services without any clinical analysis.101
The AAIDD stated,
[t]he intent of this definition is not to specify a hard and fast cutoff
point/score . . . . Rather, one needs to use clinical judgment in
interpreting the obtained score in reference to the test’s standard
error of measurement, the assessment instrument’s strengths and
102
limitations, and other factors . . . .

Hence, the most current definition interprets IQ scores in light of
the standard error of measurement and the fallibility of intelligence
tests.103
1. The Standard Error of Measurement
The standard error of measurement accounts for potential testing
errors that could alter an individual’s reported IQ score104 by providing a
95. See id. at 16. Level of functioning is further ascertained by participation in various
social settings, such as within one’s family, at school, or in the greater community. See id. at
16-17.
96. See id. at 17.
97. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8, at 19 (“Intellectual disability refers to a particular state of functioning that begins in
childhood, is multidimensional, and is affected positively by individualized supports.”).
98. See id. at 35.
99. See id. at 28.
100. See WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note 76, at 17.
101. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8, at 35.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 35-42.
104. See id. at 36.
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window of five points above and below the reported score in which the
individual’s true IQ may fall.105 Thus, an IQ score of 70 has a standard
error of measurement of 65 to 75.106 Determining where an individual’s
true IQ falls within this range is a matter of clinical judgment.107 The
standard error of measurement is a time-tested standard that is
universally utilized by leading authorities such as the AAIDD and the
APA.108 However, simply because the standard error of measurement is
universally accepted does not mean that it is universally applied by
various state service providers.109
Indeed, the inclusion of the standard error of measurement in the
modern AAIDD definition “reflected, undoubtedly, frustration over the
continuing tendency of professionals and agencies to apply the 70 IQ
ceiling inflexibly, without taking into account either standard error or
adaptive functioning level.”110 For example, although every leading
authority uses the standard error of measurement in assessing intellectual
disability, the standard error of measurement is unaccounted for in
section 1-1g.111
2.

Additional Factors Affecting the Reliability of IQ Scores

There are several factors that may falsely impact IQ scores.112
First, the Flynn Effect is the theory that each year an IQ test is utilized,
IQ scores increase by 0.33 points.113 For example, when the Wechsler
IQ test for adults (WAIS) was normed in 1995, the mean score was
100.114 Nine years later, the mean score was 103.115 Thus, an individual
who scored 69 on the WAIS test in 1995 may score a 72 on the same test
in 2004. While this artificial increase of three points may appear
105. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION: DSM-IV-TR, 41 (4th ed. 2000)
106. Id.
107. Id. at 42.
108. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8, at 36.
109. See WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note 76.
110. See Id., at 17.
111. AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, supra note 87, at 12 (stating that “[f]or
several reasons these upper IQ limits are proposed as only guidelines rather than rigid limits.
The assessment of intelligence is subject to some variation because of such factors as test
construction, circumstances of administration, and measurement errors”).
112. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8, at 35 (listing ten “challenges” that may affect the credibility of IQ scores).
113. See id. at 37.
114. See id.
115. While no one has ever fully accounted for this phenomenon, experts surmise that
social and cultural changes account for this gradual increase in scores. See id.
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inconsequential, it can mean the difference between DDS eligibility and
ineligibility. Therefore, diagnosticians must be wary of the year in
which intelligence tests are normed to ensure that scores are not inflated
by the Flynn Effect.116
Additionally, IQ scores may vary depending upon which IQ test an
individual takes, raising further reliability concerns.117 In particular,
there is a documented gap in scores between the WAIS and StanfordBinet tests118—the two tests that DDS recommends for eligibility
determinations.119 In a 2004 study, seventy-four adults previously
diagnosed with intellectual disabilities took both the WAIS and
Stanford-Binet general intelligence tests.120 In comparing the results of
the two tests, there was a ten-point difference between the full-scale IQs
for approximately 85% of the group, and a difference of more than
twenty points for approximately 24% of the group.121 In terms of
eligibility for Social Security benefits, the Stanford-Binet results would
qualify 95% of the individuals, while only 61% would qualify based on
their WAIS results.122 Evidently, the choice of test can make or break an
individual’s chances of eligibility for aid.
Over the years, the definition of intellectual disability has
undergone several significant changes.123 The most modern definition
rejects the use of rigid IQ cutoff scores, utilizing the standard error of
measurement and accounting for the fallibility of IQ tests.124
Nevertheless, DDS continues to utilize a rigid IQ cutoff score.125 The
leading case, Christopher R. v. Commissioner of Mental Retardation,
demonstrates how Connecticut’s bright-line IQ cutoff score denies
services to individuals who would otherwise be found eligible under a
modern approach.126

116. See id. (indicating that “best practices require recognition of a potential Flynn
Effect when older editions of an intelligence test . . . are used in the assessment or
interpretation of an IQ score”).
117. See id. at 38.
118. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note
8, at 38.
119. See Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
120. Silverman et al., supra note 67, at 243-44.
121. Id. at 244.
122. Id.
123. See supra Part II.A.
124. See supra Part II.B.1.
125. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011); Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
126. See Christopher R. v. Comm’r of Mental Retardation, 893 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2006).
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III. CHRISTOPHER R. & THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT’S
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1-1G
In 2006, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided Christopher R.,
This case is the
the seminal case interpreting section 1-1g.127
Connecticut Supreme Court’s only word on DDS’s authority to
determine eligibility for supports and services.128 Although the dualcriterion approach places equal emphasis on intellectual functioning and
adaptive behavior, Christopher R. demonstrates how a rigid IQ cutoff
score negates the presence of adaptive deficits, making an individual
ineligible based upon IQ alone.129
Christopher was fifteen years old when he was denied eligibility for
DDS supports and services for failure to satisfy section 1-1g.130 DDS
stipulated that Christopher satisfied the statute’s adaptive behavior
prong, finding that “[Christopher] had numerous support needs.”131
Nevertheless, he was denied eligibility based on the finding that he did
not satisfy the statute’s general intelligence requirements.132
Christopher argued that DDS’s decision exceeded the bounds of its
authority on three grounds.133 First, DDS wrongfully considered the
results of multiple intelligence tests where Christopher had one IQ score
that satisfied section 1-1g.134 Second, DDS overstepped its authority by
analyzing the component parts of various IQ tests, as opposed to
restricting its focus to Christopher’s full-scale IQ scores.135 Third, DDS
erred when it concluded that Christopher’s full-scale IQ was artificially
depressed by the other psychological diagnoses rather than an
intellectual disability.136

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 433, 434.
131. Id. at 435.
132. See id.
133. Roos ex rel. Roos v. O’Meara, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 560, 560 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)
rev’d sub nom. Christopher R. v. Comm’r of Mental Retardation, 893 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2006).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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A. The Meaning of “One or More”137 within Section 1-1g
Based on his IQ scores of 66 and 73, Christopher believed that he
satisfied the general intelligence prong of section 1-1g.138 Prior to the
2012 amendment, the plain language of section 1-1g provided that
“general intellectual functioning means the results obtained by
assessment with one or more of the individually administered general
intelligence tests . . . .”139 Christopher argued that this language meant
an applicant must have at least one general intelligence test with a score
of 69 or below140 and that DDS overstepped its authority by requiring
applicants to provide “all Cognitive/Intellectual Testing available” with
“[s]cores . . . lower than 70 points.”141 Affirming Christopher’s
argument, the lower court found that he was eligible for services based
upon his full-scale score of 66.142
The Connecticut Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s
decision, holding that section 1-1g permitted DDS to consider the results
of more than one general intelligence test.143 The court reasoned that the
137. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g
(2012)). Notably, the 2012 amendment to section 1-1g removed the “one or more” language
from the statute. The amended version provides that IQ is “measured by tests of general
intellectual functioning,” which can be reasonably understood to mean one or more tests. See
id. (emphasis added). Thus, although the “one or more” language no longer appears on the
statute’s face, reviewing courts examining DDS’s consideration of multiple IQ tests will likely
apply the same substantive standard set forth in Christopher R..
138. Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 441.
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g(c) (2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g(c) (2012)).
140. See Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 437; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 13, Christopher
R. v. Comm’r of Mental Retardation, 893 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2006).
141. Attachment C: Required Information Needed For Eligibility, DEPARTMENT OF
MENTAL RETARDATION (Mar. 27, 2001) (emphasis added).
142. In support of its holding, the lower court found that DDS’s practices essentially
require “a child’s score on all parts of all tests ever administered [to] be under 70 IQ points.
Nothing in the statutory definition of [intellectual disability] sets such a rigid or
comprehensive standard.” Roos ex rel. Roos v. O’Meara, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 560, 561 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 23, 2004) rev’d sub nom. Christopher R. v. Comm’r of Mental Retardation,
893 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2006).
143. Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 441. The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that
the lower court misinterpreted the language of section 1-1g. Id. As a matter of statutory
interpretation, it is presumed that each word carries essential meaning. Id. at 440. Therefore,
to focus on only one test when the statute states that the applicant must have an IQ of 69 as
determined by “one or more” tests, would render the “or more” language superfluous. CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 1-1g(c) (2011) (emphasis added) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 11g(c) (2012)). See Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 440 (reasoning that to adopt the lower court’s
interpretation, the court “essentially would have to read the phrase as if it stated ‘at least one’
general intelligence test, instead of ‘one or more’ intelligence tests”). As such, the lower court
erred in finding that DDS unlawfully considered the results of multiple IQ tests in assessing
Christopher’s eligibility. See id. at 441.
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legislature intended to narrow the definition of section 1-1g so that
individuals “with borderline normal intelligence” did not fall within the
statute.144 It further held that by considering multiple tests, DDS could
best ensure that eligible individuals did in fact have an intellectual
disability, rather than borderline intelligence.145
Consequently,
Christopher was found ineligible for services because one of his two IQ
scores was above the ceiling of 69.146
B. The Authority to Consider Component Parts of IQ Tests
The Connecticut Supreme Court further held that when faced with
more than two full-scale IQ scores, DDS is authorized to consider the
component parts of the IQ tests to glean the most accurate understanding
of the individual’s level of “general intellectual functioning.”147 Thus,
DDS was authorized to consider the sub-tests comprising Christopher’s
full-scale score of 67 to determine whether the score was artificially
depressed by other factors.148 The court’s holding was supported by the
American Psychiatric Association, stating that,
[w]hen there is a significant scatter in the subtest scores, the profile
strengths and weaknesses, rather than the mathematically derived
full-scale IQ, will more accurately reflect the person’s learning
abilities. When there is a marked discrepancy across verbal and
performance scores, averaging to obtain a full-scale IQ score can be
149
misleading.

Thus, although Christopher’s IQ score of 66 satisfied section 1-1g,
DDS was authorized to dissect the sub-parts of the test to determine
whether the score was artificially depressed.
According to the administering school psychologist, several factors
falsely impacted Christopher’s full-scale IQ score of 66.150 For instance,
Christopher’s low performance score of 57 was attributable to the

144. Christopher R., 893 A.2d. at 441.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 442.
148. Id. The court notes that it “do[es] not consider whether, in a case in which all IQ
tests available for the department’s consideration have full scale scores below seventy, the
defendant nevertheless properly may consider the test component scores separately . . . .” Id.
at 439 n.13. Therefore, the court left open the possibility that DDS may not be authorized to
consider sub-test scores where all of the applicant’s full-scale IQ scores are 69 or below.
149. Id. at 443-44 (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION: DSM-IV-TR, 42 (4th ed. 2000)).
150. Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 443.
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“excessive amount of time” it took Christopher to accomplish tasks.151
Therefore, the score was not truly reflective of his overall performance
ability, but simply of his ability to perform within time constraints.152
Moreover, the psychologist concluded that Christopher’s verbal score of
80 more accurately reflected his general intellectual functioning.153
Consequently, the court held that Christopher’s actual IQ did not satisfy
the intelligence criterion of section 1-1g.154
Additionally, the court granted a high degree of deference to DDS,
stating “we generally defer to an agency with expertise in matters
requiring such a technical, case-by-case determination.”155 It further
recognized that “[t]he legislature . . . delegated to [DDS] a gatekeeping
function through [its] authority to determine eligibility.”156 This wide
range of deference has impacted the role of reviewing courts in
subsequent cases challenging DDS’s authority under section 1-1g.
C. The Consideration of Multiple Diagnoses in Analyzing IQ Tests
Lastly, DDS determined that Christopher’s IQ score of 67 was
falsely depressed by other psychological diagnoses.157 The psychologist
who administered the test found that Christopher’s full-scale IQ score
was affected by his diagnosis of “pervasive developmental disorder.”158
DDS substantiated its findings by considering multiple standardized
tests previously administered for special education evaluations.159 None
of these evaluations diagnosed Christopher with an intellectual
disability, thus leading DDS to conclude that his low IQ score was
attributed to other psychological factors aside from intellectual
disability.160
Christopher R. demonstrates how DDS’s bright-line IQ cutoff score
imposes a more restrictive standard than the modern definition of
intellectual disability. The court’s inquiry was limited to whether
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 442.
156. Id. at 445.
157. Id. at 441.
158. Id. at 443.
159. Id. at 443-44.
160. Id. at 444. However, this finding was overruled by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-210b,
providing that “[t]he absence of a diagnosis of, or reference to, mental retardation, intellectual
disability or developmental disability within an individual’s school records or medical records
shall not preclude the Department of Developmental Services from making a finding of
intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g.”
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Christopher’s IQ fell above or below 69. It failed to consider the
standard error of measurement, the fallibility of IQ tests, and other
contextual factors such as Christopher’s demonstrated adaptive needs.
The 2010 AAIDD definition would have significantly increased
Christopher’s chances of accessing state services and supports.
IV. MODERNIZING CONNECTICUT’S DEFINITION OF INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITY TO REFLECT BEST PRACTICES
Connecticut’s definition of intellectual disability strays far from the
best practices set forth in the 2010 AAIDD manual.161 The “gold
standard”162 definition of intellectual disability is “significant limitations
both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in
conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills.”163 On its face, the
definition is concise and straightforward. Yet in operation, the
diagnostic process is a multidimensional analysis requiring clinical
expertise.164
DDS’s practices reduce this dynamic approach to a basic
calculus—an IQ of 69 or below.165 Though DDS purports to consider
adaptive behavior, an IQ above 69 precludes eligibility even in the face
of adaptive deficits.166 Consequently, individuals with intensive needs
are denied access to vital supports and services.167 The rigid definition
set forth in section 1-1g is based upon an antiquated understanding of
intellectual disability that no longer garners the support of
psychologists.168 In fact, the AAIDD has expressly rejected the use of
IQ cutoff scores, the cornerstone of DDS’s eligibility determinations.169
161. See generally THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY &
CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8, at 1. See supra Part II.B.
162. Tylenda et al., supra note 23, at 29.
163. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note
8, at 1.
164. See id. at 13-19; supra Part II.
165. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011); Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
166. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2011); Christopher R. v. Comm’r of Mental
Retardation, 893 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2006); Costello v. Comm’r of Developmental Services, 16
A.3d 811 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011); Allan G. v. O’Meara, No. CV105014972S, 2011 WL
3211281, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 29, 2011); Malcolm v. O’Meara, No. CV040527349S,
2005 WL 1083794 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2005); Martinez v. O’Meara, No. CV
00499604, 2001 WL 527505 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2001).
167. See supra Introduction & supra Part III.
168. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note
8, at 39-49 (“Although a fixed cutoff for diagnosing an individual as having [intellectual
disability] is not intended, and cannot be justified psychometrically, it has become operational
in some states.”) (internal citations omitted).
169. Id. at 40 (“It is clear from this significant limitations criterion used in this Manual
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Connecticut must modernize its definition of intellectual disability
so that DDS more fairly and accurately determines who is eligible for
supports and services. In order to employ best practices, the legislature
must require DDS to implement the 2010 AAIDD definition of
intellectual disability. The AAIDD definition does not impose strict IQ
cutoff scores, and accounts for the fallibility of general intelligence
tests.170 Moreover, it envisions intellectual disability as a holistic
inquiry that emphasizes the individual’s level of need.171 Ultimately, the
AAIDD definition disposes of DDS’s basic “IQ calculus,” freeing
eligibility determinations from the four corners of the IQ test.172
A. Amending the DDS Enabling Act to Include the 2010 AAIDD
Definition Is the Best Way to Ensure Best Practices
As Connecticut’s most comprehensive resource for services and
supports, DDS has an important role in ensuring that eligibility
determinations are based upon best practices.173 The most intuitive way
to comport with best practices is through amending section 1-1g to
reflect the 2010 AAIDD definition of intellectual disability. Although a
statutory amendment would alter DDS’s eligibility criteria, this is only
true to the extent that DDS’s regulations incorporate section 1-1g. If
DDS were to remove section 1-1g from its regulations, then a statutory
amendment would not affect DDS’s eligibility determinations.174
An agency’s regulations are invalid if they “are inconsistent with
the authorizing statute.”175 However, because there is no statute
that AAIDD (just as the American Psychiatric Association, 2000) does not intend for a fixed
cutoff point to be established for making the diagnosis of [intellectual disability].”); Id. at 35
(“The intent of this definition is not to specify a hard and fast cutoff point/score for meeting
the significant limitations in intellectual functioning criterion of [intellectual disability].”).
170. Id. at 35-42.
171. Id. at 13-19; see supra Part II.
172. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note
8, at 13-19.
173. See Assessing Level of Need for Supports, supra note 36.
174. Rules promulgated by administrative agencies are entitled to a large degree of
deference, and are only overturned if they contravene a governing law. See Wheelabrator
Lisbon, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 931 A.2d 159, 168-69 (Conn. 2007); Giglio v. Am.
Econ. Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 27, 35 (Conn. 2006).
175. See Wheelabrator, 931 A.2d at 168-69 (holding that an agency “cannot modify,
abridge or otherwise change the statutory provisions, under which it acquires authority unless
the statutes expressly grant it that power”) (internal quotations omitted); Giglio, 900 A.2d at
35 (“[I]t is well established that an administrative agency’s regulations are presumed valid
and, unless they are shown to be inconsistent with the authorizing statute, they have the force
and effect of a statute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4166 (2011) (providing that an agency’s regulatory powers apply to “the amendment or repeal
of a prior regulation”).
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requiring DDS to define intellectual disability in accordance with section
1-1g, DDS may remove section 1-1g from its regulations without
contravening existing law.176 DDS voluntarily incorporated section 1-1g
into its regulations pursuant to a broad legislative directive.177 As such,
there is no legislative authority that would estop DDS from removing
section 1-1g from its regulations.178 This precise issue arose in
Massachusetts
when
the
Commonwealth’s
Department
of
Developmental Services (Department) modified its regulations to create
a narrower eligibility standard.
1.

A Lesson from Massachusetts: Why a Statutory Amendment
May Not Be Binding upon DDS

The aftermath of the Massachusetts case Melican v. Morrissey aptly
illustrates that an agency is free to amend its regulations within the
parameters established by the legislature.179 In Melican, the court held
that Susan Melican was eligible for state supports and services based
upon an IQ score of 75 and demonstrated adaptive deficits.180 The court
176. The enabling act does not impose any restrictions on DDS’s discretion over the
promulgation of regulations for eligibility determinations. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-210
(2011) (stating that “[t]he commissioner shall be responsible for establishing standards,
providing technical assistance and exercising the requisite supervision of all state-supported
residential, day and program support services for persons with [intellectual disability] . . .”);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-212 (2011) (requiring DDS to “establish[] (1) criteria for (A)
determining eligibility for services provided by the department . . .”).
177. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-212 (2011) (stating that “[o]n or before September
30, 1991, the Commissioner of Developmental Services shall adopt regulations . . .
establishing (1) criteria for (A) determining eligibility for services provided by the
department”); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a-212-2(b)(2) (2001) & § 17a-212-1(10) (2001)
(providing, respectively, that “[a] person is eligible for services of the department if he . . . has
mental retardation” “as defined in section 1-1g . . . ”); Christopher R. v. Comm’r of Mental
Retardation, 893 A.2d 431, 439 (Conn. 2006) (finding that “although the defendant was not
mandated statutorily to determine eligibility in accordance with § 1-1g, the defendant
necessarily assumed such an obligation by adopting a regulation that incorporated the
statutory definition of mental retardation”).
178. This is only true to the extent that the amendment is not made “unreasonably,
arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion . . . .” Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 437
(internal quotation marks omitted).
179. See Tartarini v. Mass. Dep’t of Developmental Servs., No. 09-02278-F, 2011 WL
4528185, at n.5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2011) (finding that the Department lawfully
amended its regulations following the Melican decision because to hold otherwise, “the
Department would be effectively precluded from ever updating its regulations once the. [sic]
meaning of those regulations had been litigated in court”), rev’d, Tartarini v. Dep’t of Mental
Retardation, 972 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012); Melican v. Morrissey, No. 041368B, 2006
WL 1075465, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2006).
180. See Melican, 2006 WL 1075465, at *7 (holding that “[a]n interpretation of the 115
CMR 2.01 and the AAMR definitions of mental retardation that allows for an IQ score of 75,
taking into account the standard error of measurement, as well as a host of other factors
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found that a governing statute required the Department to determine
eligibility by using “clinical authorities” identified in its regulations.181
Accordingly, the Department incorporated the 1992 AAIDD definition
of intellectual disability into its eligibility criteria as a clinical
authority.182 Considering the standard error of measurement183 set forth
in the 1992 AAIDD manual, the court found that the hearing officer
properly determined that Melican’s IQ score of 75 satisfied the
definition.
This holding reflected a broad interpretation of the
Department’s eligibility criteria, finding that an IQ score at the upper
limits of the standard error of measurement satisfied the eligibility
requirements.184
The Department argued for a narrower construction of its
regulations, stating that Melican would only qualify for services with IQ
scores below 70.185 However, the court noted that neither the governing
statute nor the Department’s regulations imposed an IQ cutoff score—
the court even suggested that an IQ score above 75 might satisfy the
criteria.186
Undoubtedly, the “contextual and multidimensional
approach” asserted in Melican would have increased the number of
future applicants deemed eligible for services.187
On the heels of Melican, the Department amended its regulations to
avoid the sweeping implications of the court’s holding;188 the
indicating significant subaverage intellectual functioning and limitations in adaptive skill
areas, is reasonable and consistent with the law”).
181. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123B, § 1 (2010) (amended by St. 2012, c. 433, eff.
April 8, 2013) (defining an individual with an intellectual disability as “a person who, as a
result of inadequately developed or impaired intelligence, as determined by clinical
authorities as described in the regulations of the department, is substantially limited in the
person’s ability to learn or adapt, as judged by established standards available for the
evaluation of a person’s ability to function in the community . . . .”) (emphasis added);
Melican, 2006 WL 1075465, at *4.
182. See Melican, 2006 WL 1075465, at *7.
183. Id.
184. Id. at *2.
185. See id.
186. See id. at *6 (“This Court notes that nowhere in G.L.c. 123B, the Department’s
regulations, or the AAMR’s definition of mental retardation does it say that a score over 75
automatically and permanently disqualifies an applicant from consideration for Department
eligibility. In fact, IQ scores are neither mentioned in G.L.c. 123B nor any Department
regulation found in the Record.”).
187. Id. at *7.
188. See 115 MASS. CODE REGS. § 2.01 (2009) (amended 2013) (imposing cutoff score
of 70 and deleting reference to 1992 AAIDD definition). See also Brief of PlaintiffAppellant, at 28, Tartarini v. Mass. Dep’t of Developmental Servs., No. 09-02278-F, 2011
WL 4528185 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2011) (stating “[t]he 2006 revision was profound,
unmooring the regulation from any ‘established standard’ and instead adopting a bright-line
test contemplated nowhere in the statute”).
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Department removed the 1992 AAIDD definition, and established a
strict IQ cutoff score of 70.189 This amendment was challenged in the
2011 case of Tartarini v. Massachusetts Department of Developmental
Services on the grounds that the Department “promulgated the regulation
with the intent of nullifying Melican, under which a greater number of
people would qualify for . . . services.”190 Specifically, Tartarini argued
that the new regulation violated the governing statute because it no
longer identified “clinical authorities” as required by the statute.191
Reversing the lower court, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held
that the Department exceeded its statutory authority by removing
reference to the 1992 AAIDD definition and implementing a strict IQ
cutoff score that was “untethered to the statutory mandate.”192 It
remanded the case to the Department for resolution under a regulatory
framework that identified clinical authorities as required by the
governing statute.193 The Department responded by creating a definition
reflecting the 2010 AAIDD standard.194
Additionally, the legislature responded to Tartarini by amending
189. See Tartarini, 2011 WL 4528185, at *7 n.5.
190. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, at 35 Tartarini v. Mass. Dep’t of Developmental
Servs., No. 09-02278-F, 2011 WL 4528185 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2011). See generally
Tartarini, 2011 WL 4528185 (alteration in original). The Department found Tartarini
ineligible for services and supports in light of IQ scores of 69 and 71, and virtual dependence
upon her mother. Id.
191. See Tartarini, 2011 WL 4528185, at *5-6 (arguing that “this earlier, broader
definition of mental retardation was more consistent with the statutory requirement that
mental retardation be judged by ‘established standards’”). See also Brief of PlaintiffAppellant, at 29 Tartarini v. Mass. Dep’t of Developmental Servs., No. 09-02278-F, 2011 WL
4528185 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2011) (arguing that “[t]he abandonment of the generally
accepted AAMR/AAIDD definition, which was accomplished solely by regulatory fiat, was
beyond statutory authority”).
192. Tartarini v. Dep’t of Mental Retardation, 972 N.E.2d 33, 37 (Mass. App. Ct.
2012).
193. Id. at 39.
194. The Department amended its regulations to define intellectual disability as:
consistent with the standard contained in the 11th edition of the American
Association of Intellectual Disabilities: Definition, Classification, and Systems of
Supports (2010), significantly sub-average intellectual functioning existing concurrently with and related to significant limitations
in
adaptive
functioning.
Intellectual Disability originates before age 18. . . . The determination of the
presence or absence of intellectual disability requires that exercise of clinical
judgment.
115 MASS. CODE REGS. § 2.01 (2009) (amended 2013). Additionally, the Department
amended its regulations to define significantly sub-average intellectual functioning as “an
intelligence test score that is indicated by a score of approximately 70 or below as determined
from the findings of assessment using valid and comprehensive, individual measures of
intelligence that are administered in standardized formats and interpreted by qualified
practitioners.” Id.
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the governing statute, removing the ambiguous reference to “clinical
authorities” altogether, and defining intellectual disability using the 2010
AAIDD manual.195 The amended statute not only defines intellectual
disability in a manner “consistent with the most recent definition
provided by the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities,” but it also lists the five multi-dimensional
factors used by AAIDD as essential to accurate assessment.196
This statutory amendment is highly analogous to the proposed
amendment to the DDS enabling act, advocated by this Note. The
Connecticut legislature must learn from the lessons of Melican and
Tartarini and amend the DDS enabling act to incorporate the 2010
AAIDD assessment methods. Because DDS’s regulations must comply
with the enabling act,197 the proposed amendment will ensure that
eligibility determinations align with best practices.
2.

The Benefits of Amending DDS’s Enabling Act

DDS can achieve best practices in eligibility determinations by
incorporating the AAIDD standards into the enabling act as set forth
herein:
[T]he Commissioner of Developmental Services shall adopt
regulations . . . establishing (1) criteria consistent with best practices
for assessing intellectual disability, as set forth by the American
Association for Individuals with Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities [AAIDD] for (A) determining eligibility for services
198
provided by the department . . . .

This proposed amendment unambiguously ensures that DDS will
implement the most modern definition of intellectual disability. The
enabling act’s direct reference to the AAIDD aligns DDS’s practices
with those utilized by the leading authority in assessing intellectual
disability.199 Unlike the ambiguous reference to “clinical authorities”
within the Massachusetts statute, this proposed amendment establishes
clear guidelines for both DDS and reviewing courts.200 Moreover, it
195. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123B, § 1 (2010) (amended by St. 2012, c. 433, eff.
April 8, 2013).
196. Id.
197. See Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 931 A.2d 159, 16869 (Conn. 2007) (holding that an agency “cannot modify, abridge or otherwise change the
statutory provisions, under which it acquires authority unless the statutes expressly grant it
that power”) (internal quotations omitted).
198. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-212 (2011) (emphasis added).
199. Tylenda et al., supra note 23, at 29; see also supra Part III.
200. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123B, § 1 (2010) (amended by St. 2012, c. 433, eff.
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sufficiently protects individuals with intellectual disabilities—if DDS
fails to implement best practices, the court has the authority to determine
that DDS’s regulations unlawfully contravene the enabling act.201
There are several advantages to amending the enabling act to
expressly require best practices. First, the proposed amendment
overcomes the issue of blanket deference given to DDS’s eligibility
determinations. Though DDS receives deference as the expert body
serving individuals with intellectual disabilities, there must be some
degree of judicial oversight to ensure that its practices are both lawful
and fair.202 Connecticut case law demonstrates the courts’ hesitancy to
overturn any of DDS’s eligibility determinations, rendering judicial
review virtually meaningless.203
Christopher R. set a strong precedent solidifying DDS’s broad
power.204 There, the court vested DDS with an arsenal of authority in
analyzing an applicant’s general intelligence, including the ability to
consider (1) more than one test;205 (2) the subparts of each test;206 (3)
other psychological diagnoses;207 (4) all other tests, regardless of
whether they measure general intelligence;208 (5) the applicant’s
educational profile;209 and (6) the absence of formal diagnosis of
April 8, 2013) (defining an individual with an intellectual disability as “a person who, as a
result of inadequately developed or impaired intelligence, as determined by clinical
authorities as described in the regulations of the department, is substantially limited in the
person’s ability to learn or adapt, as judged by established standards available for the
evaluation of a person’s ability to function in the community”) (emphasis added); Melican v.
Morrissey, No. 041368B, 2006 WL 1075465, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2006).
201. See Wheelabrator, 931 A.2d at 168-69; Giglio v. Am. Econ. Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 27,
35 (Conn. 2006).
202. See Christopher R. v. Comm’r of Mental Retardation, 893 A.2d 431, 442 (Conn.
2006) (noting that the court “generally defer[s] to an agency with expertise in matters
requiring such a technical, case-by-case determination”).
203. See e.g., id. at 431; Costello v. Comm’r of Developmental Servs., 16 A.3d 811
(Conn. App. Ct. 2011); Allan G. v. O’Meara, No. CV105014972S, 2011 WL 3211281, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 29, 2011); Malcolm v. O’Meara, No. CV040527349S, 2005 WL
1083794 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 2005); Martinez v. O’Meara, No. CV 00499604, 2001
WL 527505 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2001).
204. See e.g., Costello, 16 A.3d at 816 (resolving a battle of the experts in favor of
DDS, finding that the plaintiffs did not overcome the deferential standard established in
Christopher R.); Allan G., 2011 WL 3211281, at *2 (denial of eligibility where the court
quotes the “gatekeeping function” language from Christopher R.).
205. Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 442.
206. Id. at 432.
207. Id. at 444.
208. Id. at 443.
209. Id. at 444. However, as previously noted, this finding was overruled by CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 17a-210b, providing that “[t]he absence of a diagnosis of, or reference to,
mental retardation, intellectual disability or developmental disability within an individual's
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intellectual disability.210 This broad grant of authority gives DDS ample
opportunities to make eligibility determinations based upon IQ alone.211
In effort to reign in DDS’s unfettered discretion, the proposed
amendment not only requires DDS to look beyond intellectual
functioning in its eligibility determinations, but it also gives courts a
clear legislative standard against which to review such determinations.212
In accord with the 2010 AAIDD manual, the regulations place equal
emphasis on general intelligence and adaptive behavior, as well as factor
in the standard error of measurement and any other pertinent
considerations.213
Absent this amendment, there is no authority
compelling DDS to implement best practices.
Additionally, this amendment enables DDS to timely amend its
regulations so that its practices reflect the evolving understanding of
intellectual disability. The social construct of intellectual disability and
assessment methods have progressed significantly over time.214
Correspondingly, the AAIDD has published eleven manuals reflecting
these changes.215 Certainly the most recent definition of intellectual
disability will not be the last.216 Thus, it is important that DDS be able
school records or medical records shall not preclude the Department of Developmental
Services from making a finding of intellectual disability, as defined in section 1-1g.”
210. Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 444.
211. Additionally, several lower courts have relied upon the Connecticut Supreme
Court’s recognition that the legislature vested DDS with a “gatekeeping function,” resulting in
denials of eligibility in the majority of the cases. Id. at 445. See e.g., Costello, 16 A.3d at 816
(resolving a battle of the experts in favor of DDS, finding that the plaintiffs did not overcome
the deferential standard established in Christopher R.); Allan G., 2011 WL 3211281, at *2
(denial of eligibility where the court quotes the “gatekeeping function” language from
Christopher R.).
212. For example, in Melican the court considered the definition of intellectual
disability set forth in the 1994 AAIDD, pursuant to a statute requiring reliance on “clinical
authorities,” to find the applicant eligible for services and supports. See Melican, 2006 WL
1075465, at *4.
213. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8, at 28-29.
214. See id. at xiii-xiv (discussing the historical changes to the definition of intellectual
disability throughout the AAIDD’s manuals); supra Part II.
215. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8, at xiii-xiv (discussing the historical changes to the definition of intellectual disability
throughout the AAIDD’s manuals); supra Part II.
216. For example, while intelligence is currently understood as a single trait, there is
increasing support for the notion that intelligence is multi-layered. The concept of “multiple
intelligences” contemplates several areas of intelligence, including “linguistic, logicalmathematical, spatial, musical, bodily kinesthetic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal.” THE
AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note 8, at 33. The
most current manual suggests that when assessment methods for “multiple intelligences” have
more scientific support, methods for measuring intellectual functioning may shift, replacing
the IQ test as we know it. Id. at 34 (stating that “until such measures of multiple intelligence
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to efficiently alter its regulations to comply with these changes. Because
state agencies are better situated than the legislature to make expeditious
amendments,217 requiring DDS to promulgate regulations that adhere to
best practices is the most effective way to ensure that individuals with
intellectual disabilities are assessed in the most modern light.
Moreover, during discussions regarding the 2012 amendment to
section 1-1g, the legislature contemplated an amendment almost
identical to that proposed herein.218 The legislature inquired into
whether it should refer to the definition of intellectual disability in the
forthcoming DSM “rather than insert[ing that] language as definition” in
section 1-1g.”219 One Representative expressed specific concern that
legislators, most of whom lack any medical background, are ill-equipped
to define intellectual disability.220 He stated,
I’m much more comfortable with a professional body making these .
. . definitions then [sic] us because what it does is simply politicize
these issues. I would rather they be professionalized . . . . I’m
wondering if, you know, from 50,000 feet, we’re going down the
wrong path by frequently redefining the statute what is already
221
defined by a professional body.

This legislator’s concerns underscore the importance of
incorporating the AAIDD definition in the enabling act to ensure an
ongoing commitment to best practices.
DDS might further argue that amending the enabling act would
impose an undue administrative burden because DDS would be required
to modify its regulations each time the AAIDD revealed new
developments in the assessment of intellectual disability. However,
while requiring DDS to consistently modify its assessment methods
might be financially burdensome, these concerns are outweighed by the
needs of individuals with intellectual disabilities.
Though preservation of financial resources is important, one must
consider the incidental price inherent in such conservatism—there is a
human cost in the failure to implement modern practices. In the face of
can be assessed reliably and validly, it is the position of AAIDD that intellectual functioning .
. . is best conceptualized and captured by a general factor of intelligence”).
217. See generally CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-166-176 (2011) (providing procedures for
the promulgation of regulations).
218. See An Act Concerning the Definition of Mental Retardation and Intellectual
Disability: Hearing on H.B. 5437 Before the Pub. Health Comm., 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Conn. Oct. 2012) (statement of Representative Perillo).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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the evolving understanding of intellectual disability, DDS cannot escape
the modernization of its practices by waving fiscal flags. If the financial
burden becomes too high, then this must be brought to the legislature’s
attention. It is DDS’s statutory responsibility to comply with best
practices, no matter the financial cost, in order to avoid paying a human
price.
B. The 2010 AAIDD Definition of Intellectual Disability Considers the
Person – Not the Paper
By amending the enabling act, DDS will be forced to abandon strict
IQ cutoff scores and give equal emphasis to general intelligence and
adaptive behavior. As a result, individuals with IQ scores within the
standard error of measurement (70-75), and even above it—where scores
are inflated by other extrinsic factors—will not be summarily found
ineligible for services. Ultimately, many of those turned away under
section 1-1g would be properly classified as having an intellectual
disability, and thereby gain access to supports and services otherwise
foreclosed.
1.

Need by Numbers

Under the current eligibility scheme, DDS denies services and
supports to individuals who would undoubtedly benefit from them. In
nearly every eligibility determination case, DDS stipulates that the
individual struggles with activities of daily living and is virtually
dependent on family and friends.222 Individuals with adaptive deficits
make up one side of the eligibility ledger, demonstrating significant
needs in their activities of daily living. On the other side of the ledger,
DDS offers supports and services to improve daily living skills.223
Considering both sides of the ledger, common sense dictates that DDS

222. Costello v. Comm’r of Developmental Servs., 16 A.3d 811, 817 (Conn. App. Ct.
2011) (finding that “the plaintiff has demonstrated deficits in her adaptive behavior and that
she needs special education accommodations. Nonetheless, the record furnishes a reasonable
factual basis for the administrative finding that the plaintiff did not qualify for the
department’s services because her test scores on several intelligence tests did not establish
subaverage general intellectual ability and therefore did not satisfy the eligibility requirement
contained in § 1-1g”); Allan G. v. O’Meara, No. CV105014972S, 2011 WL 3211281, at *3
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 29, 2011) (the hearing officer found that Allan “exhibit[ed] deficits in
his adaptive behavior during the developmental period. But in order to qualify for services
Allan G. must have both subaverage intellectual functioning and deficits in adaptive behavior.
Therefore he is not eligible for services.”).
223. Eligible individuals undergo a “supports intensity scale” screening to identify
services best tailored to their personal needs.
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provides services to those individuals who are in need.
In reality, IQ cutoff scores eviscerate the common sense approach.
Even when an individual would benefit from supports and services, DDS
denies eligibility on the basis of IQ. For example, in Christopher R.,
Christopher’s father “testified regarding [Christopher’s] lack of selfdirection and offered evidence regarding [Christopher’s] day-to-day
dependence on family and school professionals.”224 Although DDS
recognized Christopher’s “numerous support needs,” it nevertheless
found him ineligible.225 Similarly, in Allan G., Allan was deemed
ineligible despite evidence that his mother had to remind him how to
“eat, bathe, and dress,” and that he was “incapable of functioning
without support in any situation.”226
Nevertheless, DDS consistently asserts that supports and services
are reserved for those “most in need.”227 DDS’s pervasive recognition
that its denied applicants are in need of “a lot of help”228 is unnerving,
considering the very thing that these individuals need most, services and
supports, is the very thing they are denied. An individual who DDS
recognizes “needs a lot of help,” has a “lack of self-direction,” and who
is wholly dependent on “family and school professionals,” is simply not
in need enough.229 DDS does not serve those most in need. Rather, IQ
is the beginning and the end of the diagnostic process.
2.

Doing Something About Individuals with Intellectual
Disabilities Who Are “Doing Nothing”230

While all individuals with intellectual disabilities benefit from
supports and services, the nature of these services varies widely
depending on the individual’s level of functioning. For instance,
individuals with lower IQ scores often rely upon supports to help them
224. Christopher R. v. Comm’r of Mental Retardation, 893 A.2d 431, 445 (Conn. 2006)
225. Id.
226. Allan G., 2011 WL 3211281, at *2.
227. Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 441 (emphasis added). In Dep’t of Developmental
Servs. v. Michael A., DDS argued that “[b]ecause of our limited funding, we need to make
sure that the people who receive the funding are those who have deficits, that are
[intellectually disabled],” meaning that they have an IQ of 69 or below. Transcript of
Hearing, Dep’t of Developmental Servs. v. Michael A., (June 17, 2011) (unpublished transcript
from administrative hearing) (on file with author).
228. Christopher R., 893 A.2d at 435.
229. Id.
230. See generally Julie Lounds Taylor & Robert M. Hodapp, Doing Nothing: Adults
With Disabilities With No Daily Activities and Their Siblings, 117 AM. J. ON INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 67 (2012) (presenting a recent study showing that many
individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities are without daily activities).
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perform basic activities of daily living.231 Comparatively, those with
higher IQ scores (falling within or slightly above the standard error of
measurement of 70-75) often depend on more dynamic services to help
them gain greater independence. In reference to individuals with higher
IQs, the AAIDD notes that “the gap between their capabilities and the
demands from their environments grows as they leave school, as society
becomes more complex, and as the standards for successful adulthood
climb.”232 Thus, those with higher IQs are uniquely vulnerable because
their efforts to engage in the community are often met with high societal
pressures and expectations.233 Without the proper supports and services,
these higher functioning individuals either struggle to be a part of the
community, or their participation is precluded altogether. Historically,
individuals with higher IQs have fallen through the cracks of the formal
supports system, becoming members of “the forgotten generation.”234
By failing to recognize the adaptive needs of individuals with
higher IQ scores, many of DDS’s denied applicants join the “forgotten
generation.”235 Because DDS offers the most comprehensive services
and supports within Connecticut, denied applicants do not have a
comparable alternative source of assistance.236 Thus, the burden of care
often falls upon family members who must balance the demands of their
own careers, goals, and other personal responsibilities.237 More often
than not, this is an impossible balance to strike.
Additionally, like most people, individuals with intellectual
disabilities have goals and dreams that they wish to achieve.238 While
231. See Fact Sheet, supra note 11.
232. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note
8, at 152. See also id. at 153 (identifying several challenges faced by individuals with higher
IQs).
233. Unlike lower functioning individuals who are not as actively engaged in “normal”
community life. Id. at 151-52.
234. The “forgotten generation” is comprised “of people with [intellectual disability]
with higher IQ scores and people without [intellectual disability] but with lower IQ scores,
whose IQ scores are just beyond the [intellectual disability] range.” Id. at 153.
235. Id.
236. See Assessing Level of Need for Supports, supra note 36.
237. For example, Michael’s mother emphasized the importance of DDS services,
considering her health concerns and responsibilities in caring for her other children. See
Statement of Cathy A., supra note 1; supra Introduction; see also Tartarini, 2011 WL
4528185, at *2 (discussing Tartarini’s virtual dependence upon her mother).
238. Michael A. stated, “[m]y goals for the future is graduate high school, go to college,
buy a house, marry a woman, and have kids.” An Act Concerning Expansion of the Pilot
Program for Persons with Autism Spectrum Disorders: Hearing on Substitute for H.B. 5666
(2008) (statement of Michael A.). See also Taylor & Hodapp, supra note 230, at 67. (stating
that “[l]ike adults in the general population, individuals with intellectual and developmental
disabilities require activities and stimulation to feel fulfilled”).
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everyone has obstacles to overcome in this regard, individuals with
intellectual disabilities face an additional hurdle. IQ is frequently the
barricade to self-betterment. Strict IQ cutoff scores deny individuals the
opportunity to reach their fullest potential. A recent study shows that
many individuals with intellectual disabilities literally do nothing
throughout the day.239 Of the 796 study participants with intellectual or
developmental disabilities, 13% led sedentary lifestyles.240
Moreover, those sedentary individuals had three times more unmet
service needs than their active counterparts,241 and were “more likely to
show higher levels of behavioral, health, and functional problems.”242
Presumably, these individuals would be more engaged in the community
and would enjoy greater overall health if their service needs were met.
As it stands, individuals who are denied services despite adaptive needs
may never achieve their goals—or for that matter, anything at all.
The incorporation of the 2010 AAIDD definition into the enabling
act will permanently seal the cracks of the formal supports system. This
definition views intellectual disability as a state of being that can be
improved through proper supports and services.243 A co-author of the
2010 AAIDD manual stated,
[t]he level of human functioning, of any of us, is directly related to
the supports that we receive. And so consequently, taking it away
from just the focus upon the defect that the individual has, and
looking at what is the potential of that person in regards to human
functioning with appropriate supports, then you really have a
244
complete system.

This supports-oriented model would require DDS to analyze IQ
scores with greater flexibility; an IQ score above 69 may fall within the
standard error of measurement, or may be artificially inflated by
extrinsic factors. Ultimately, this is a question of clinical judgment that
cannot be made within the vacuum of IQ.245 Therefore, DDS’s implementation of best practices would likely extend services to individuals
otherwise found ineligible. For example, Christopher R. could have
239. Lounds Taylor & Hodapp, supra note 230, at 67.
240. Id. at 69, 72.
241. Id. at 76.
242. Id.
243. See THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra
note 8, at 13-19.
244. AAIDD books, Classification & Intellectual Disability CC, YOUTUBE (April 26,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=80rc4ZAtQ0I.
245. THE AAIDD AD HOC COMM. ON TERMINOLOGY & CLASSIFICATION, supra note
8, 39-40.
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been resolved in favor of Christopher under the 2010 AAIDD definition.
There, the two competing IQ scores were 66 and 73.246 According to
best practices, both scores might satisfy the definition of intellectual
disability. Though DDS argued that the score of 73 fell beyond the
range of intellectual disability, it is within the standard error of
measurement. Although the standard error of measurement may also
make Christopher’s IQ score 78, the discrepancy over Christopher’s true
IQ would be resolved through clinical judgment.
Considering
Christopher’s utter dependence upon family and school employees, his
“numerous supports needs,” and another IQ test where he scored 66, it
seems more likely that Christopher’s true IQ is below 73, rather than
above it.247 Under this analysis, Christopher would have been deemed
eligible for services.
Similarly, Michael would have benefitted from the AAIDD
definition. In Department of Developmental Services v. Michael,
Michael scored consistently within the intellectually disabled range with
IQs of 64, 69, and 69.248 When he received an IQ score of 81, it came as
a surprise to both the psychologist who administered the test and
DDS.249 At the hearing, the administering psychologist postulated
several testing errors that may have inflated Michael’s score,250 arguing
that Michael’s strong memory skills may have artificially increased
subtest scores measuring comprehension.251 He surmised that while
Michael’s responses seemingly demonstrated comprehension of the
questions asked, his answers might actually have been the product of his
rote memory skills.252 Additionally, the psychologist argued that the

246. Christopher R. v. Comm’r of Mental Retardation, 893 A.2d 431, 441 (Conn.
2006).
247. Id. at 435.
248. Transcript of Hearing at 21, Dep’t of Developmental Servs. v. Michael A. (June 17,
2011) (unpublished transcript from administrative hearing) (on file with author).
249. The administering psychologist stated that Michael’s “huge spike in the test
results” was something he had “never seen . . . before in any of the children [he] tested.” Id.
at 33. Also, DDS’s psychologist stated, “I certainly found the result—the WAIS Three result
[of 81] that was reported 2009 [sic]—to be surprising,” and that it was “a staggering, kind of,
unusual result.” Id. at 55.
250. Id. at 29-33.
251. Id.
252. For example, Michael knew who the President was during the Civil War, but when
asked when the Civil War was, he answered, “two weeks ago.” Also, Michael identified
Cleopatra as the Queen of the Nile, but when asked what a queen was, he said, “Queen. A
queen is a queen.” The administering psychologist concluded that Michael’s responses were
generated through rote memory skills rather than substantive comprehension. Id. at 29-31
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Flynn Effect may have resulted in a higher IQ score.253 Under the
AAIDD, these factors would have been given additional weight in the
contextual determination of intellectual disability.
Instead of treating the assessment process as a means to providing
necessary assistance, DDS’s continued emphasis on IQ cutoff scores
clings to the relic of the pre-1992 classification system by connoting
higher IQ scores with higher levels of functioning.254 A modernized
definition of intellectual disability is the key to opening up a world of
supports and services to individuals with IQ scores above 69.
C. How Other States Define Intellectual Disability for Supports and
Services255
On a national scale, Connecticut utilizes the most restrictive
definition of intellectual disability for eligibility determinations.256
Connecticut and New Jersey are the only states that continue to
implement an IQ cutoff score of 69 or below for eligibility services.257
Additionally, thirteen other states, including Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and Vermont, all impose IQ cutoff scores of 70 or below.258
There are eight states that incorporate the standard error of
measurement, utilizing the word “approximately” within their definitions
or establishing 75 as the maximum IQ score.259 Moreover, three states
expressly incorporate the AAIDD definition into their eligibility

253. Id. at 31-32 (stating that Michael’s score may have been inflated given the changes
to standardized testing that took place between the publication of the WAIS-III test, which
was being phased out and replaced by the WAIS-IV test at the time it was administered to
Michael). See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the Flynn Effect.
254. The pre-1992 definition conceptualized intellectual disability as an immutable
characteristic that could not be improved through supportive measures. AM. ASS’N ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, supra note 86, at 19 (based on the Wechsler standard deviation). See
supra Part II.
255. The information provided in this section was compiled by Erin Hehn, a law
student at Villanova University School of Law, while working as a Summer Fellow at the
Massachusetts Disability Law Center (http://www.dlc-ma.org/). I am grateful to Erin, as well
as Attorney Richard Glassman, for sharing this information with me.
256. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2012); Erin Hehn, Eligibility Requirements for
Developmental
Disabilities
(Nov.
2011),
available
at
http://www.dlcma.org/Resources/Intellectual_and_or_Developmental/chart_of_state_laws_defining_int.htm
(fifty-state survey of eligibility criteria for services for individuals with intellectual and
developmental disabilities).
257. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1g (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-25.1; Hehn, supra
note 256.
258. See Hehn, supra note 256.
259. Id.
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criteria.260 On the other end of the spectrum, twenty-four states do not
impose any IQ cutoff scores at all.261 These states either utilize a
broader definition of intellectual disability, or they provide services for
individuals with developmental disabilities.262 Connecticut must follow
the example set by these states to eliminate the “forgotten generation.”
While this fifty-state survey demonstrates the modernized practices
utilized by many states, it also reveals that Connecticut is not alone in its
need to implement best practices. Yet, the fact that many states utilize
bright-line IQ cutoff scores does not justify this practice—it merely
demonstrates that although the definition of intellectual disability has
undergone several paradigmatic changes, many states have been slow to
follow.
The dark history of intellectual disability teaches that failing to
modernize assessment methods may have devastating consequences,
such as institutionalization or sterilization. Thus, it is imperative that
legislation follow the ebb and flow of the social and psychological tides.
D. The Genius of IQ Cutoff Scores
No other population of individuals has its quality of life dictated
solely by IQ.263 For the majority of the population, IQ is something that
is barely talked about, by and large because it is irrelevant to daily life.
Individuals who are considered “clever” and “intelligent” earn these
labels based upon the personal impressions of their peers, and not based
upon their IQ scores. Yet one must wonder whether society would
benefit from categorical regulation based on intellectual functioning.
Imagine the opportunities that could be reserved to those with
higher intellectual functioning. There could be IQ cutoff scores for
college admissions or job promotions. And certainly the President of the
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. In addition to modernizing the definition of intellectual disability, Connecticut
should ultimately aim to provide services to all individuals in Connecticut with developmental
disabilities. “Developmental Disabilities” is an umbrella term referring to disorders that
impair development in areas such as “reciprocal social interaction skills, communication
skills, or the presence of stereotyped behavior, interests, and activities.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOC., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS FOURTH EDITION
DSM-IV-TR 69 (4th ed. 2000). Intellectual disability is a type of developmental disorder. Id.
263. James Harris, a member of the APA working on the DSM-V revision of the
definition of intellectual disability stated, “There is only one diagnosis that’s based on a test . .
. . All the other diagnoses are based on people. We want to focus on the person, not the
number.” Michelle Diament, DSM Committee Takes Heat Over ‘Mental Retardation’ Update,
DISABILITY SCOOP (May 29, 2012), http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/29/dsm-mentalretardation-update/15718/.
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United States should have an above-average, if not genius, IQ. Maybe
overcrowded hospitals should join the plot, administering care to those
“most in need”—just as DDS defines “most in need” on the basis of IQ
and not on actual adaptive needs, so too could hospitals prioritize care
through IQ cutoff scores rather than actual medical needs. This would
promote overall social welfare by ensuring that individuals with the
highest IQs are able to continue leading society.
Such a world, where IQ cutoff scores open (and close) doors of
opportunity, is clearly a work of fiction. There are no IQ cutoff scores
for college admissions, job promotions, or even the Presidency. And the
idea of prioritizing healthcare on the basis of IQ screams eugenics and
would never make it to the negotiation table. Yet if IQ is so indicative
of individual capabilities, then why don’t we widely impose cutoff
scores?
There is a fundamental discomfort with quantifying the
opportunities available to the average and above average individual.
Shouldn’t we question, then, why we are so comfortable quantifying the
quality of life of individuals of lesser intelligence? The impulse to resist
an IQ-regulated society at large, while still utilizing IQ cutoff scores for
individuals of lesser intelligence, is indicative of an underlying
prejudice—or at least apathy—to the plight of individuals with
intellectual disabilities.
CONCLUSION
The Connecticut DDS plays a critical role in the lives of
Connecticut residents with intellectual disabilities.
Through the
eligibility determination process, DDS determines who is eligible for
services and supports that improve the individual’s quality of life. In
many ways, these services function as a lifeline to individuals with
intellectual disabilities, elevating them from a state of mere survival to
one of health and happiness.
DDS’s use of a bright-line IQ cutoff score denies services to
individuals in need. Although the current statute requires DDS to place
equal emphasis on IQ and adaptive behavior, the IQ cutoff score is
dispositive, overlooking clinical judgment and thereby denying
eligibility based upon IQ alone. Effectively, DDS deems individuals
ineligible without ever looking up from the paper to see the person.
The AAIDD’s definition of intellectual disability rejects the use of
IQ cutoff scores. It emphasizes the important role of clinical judgment
in interpreting IQ scores, considering the standard error of measurement
and other testing errors. Most importantly, the AAIDD places the
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individual’s overall well-being at the center of the diagnostic process.
The Connecticut legislature must amend DDS’s enabling statute to
require compliance with the AAIDD definition.
Without this
amendment, Connecticut will continue to neglect the needs of
individuals with intellectual disabilities who have nowhere else to turn.
Kathleen D. Tetreault*
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